1) The notion of disposition and relevance in defining International Relations phenomena:

Potential interactions between discreet entities (e.g. nation-states or other social collectives) is largely predicated upon relational disposition.  Here, disposition is defined precisely (and it is argued, sufficiently) by:

Here, trust can be explicit or implicit.  It also subsumes two notions: First, the notion that the other State will (or will not) keep promises and contracts (or treaties).  Second, the idea that a trustworthy entity at least intends no harm to one’s self, and at best intends support ( e.g. malice vs. benefice).

Compatibility deals with perceptions and evidence of shared goals (or the opposite, for incompatibility).

Attraction connotes not shared goals, but interdependencies, where one State has a vested interest in a capability or resource of another.

Once disposition has been generally characterized (which is necessarily a relative rather than an absolute valuation) the additional notion of ir/relevance (or dis/respect) can be applied to determine the likelihood and magnitude of interaction.  Disposition controls the form of such interaction.

2) Available responses to existential threats:

Given a perceived existential threat, threatened entities (including nation-states, sects, communities or individuals) have exactly three options of threat mitigation.  All actions taken related to a threat will constitute expression of one or more of the following strategies:

4) Cooperative patterns in International Relations:

Dynamic theories of complex systems, common to the physical sciences, have application to understanding the genesis and effectiveness of any multi-entity cooperative framework, including the cooperation of nation-states.  These theories deal with the notions of entropy, efficiency and emergent patterns.  These patterns may be long-lasting, or transient, depending on constraints imposed on the overall system.  These constraints are the result of environmental conditions imposed in a largely involuntary or unavoidable way.  International Relations, and indeed any systems analysis of volitional entities must also consider constraints on behavior imposed by norms, laws, mores and controlled (or limited) information-flows. 

Thus, there are three broad categories of interaction that facilitate the creation of international structure: 

 5) The problem of measure

Implicit and explicit in many discussions of International Relations is the notion of relative or absolute measure.  Realists and their derivatives talk about measuring power (and its balance).  Structuralists add concepts of economic capability and costs.  Cost / benefit tallies are common to most theories using the notion of rational choice, which is assumed to be practiced by some (or most) States.  Theories which emphasize the important of endogenous social factors must consider finding ways to measure or convey levels of “happiness”, “discontent”, “nationalism” and the like.  Conversely, those which emphasize exogenous factors such as competition for resources (or power) face challenges of measuring the relevant factors. 

Thus, the ability of different theories to predict State behavior is tied not just to qualitative differences in approach, but also to the accuracy and precision of quantitative analysis.  It can be argued that theories which are more amenable to measurement, such as those stressing economic and military rather than psychological factors, are more amenable to validation.  Further, it behoves political scientists to attempt such rigorous validation wherever and whenever possible so that competing theories may be supported or discounted.

6) The problem of rational-choice

Implicit and explicit in many discussions of International Relations is the notion of rational choice.  This notion is inherently highly problematic, and thus theories predicated upon its auspices should be viewed with similar suspicion.  Rational choice assumes:

Each of these assumptions can (and, it is argued, often are) violated by State decision-makers.  Specifically relating to the first point, as information-flows to decision-makers become limited (or are artificially limited), even rational approaches to causal analysis becomes erroneous.   The second assumption of pragmatism ignores frequently relevant (if not endemic) motivations and confidence-levels arising from ideological faith rather than impartial causal analysis.  The last assumption assumes that decision makers will process information in a logically consistent and non-fallacious manner.  This assumption ignores the fact that most people easily fall prey to basic logical fallacies when analyzing a given context.  Such fallacies as “appeal to authority”, “guilt by association”, “invalid cause-and-effect” and ”appeal to the masses”, to name but a few, have proved endemic to human decision making.  Thus, theories of International Relations predicated upon these three assumptions may be attractive idealizations, but are so far from being realistic as to be little more than an abstract intellectual exercise